内容简介：This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world. Extensive research has examined the effects of ownership structures on the value of firms, with the role of large investors receiving special attention. Investors with large ownership stakes have strong incentives to maximize their firms’ value and are able to collect information and oversee managers, and so can help overcome one of the principal-agent problems in the modern corporation—that of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Large shareholders also have strong incentives to put pressure on managers or even to oust them through a proxy fight or a takeover. “Large shareholders thus address the agency problem in that they have both a general interest in profit maximization, and enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interest respected” ......
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